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ABSTRACT
Data-driven machine learning (ML) has witnessed great successes
across a variety of application domains. Since ML model training
are crucially relied on a large amount of data, there is a growing
demand for high quality data to be collected for ML model train-
ing. However, from data owners’ perspective, it is risky for them
to contribute their data. To incentivize data contribution, it would
be ideal that their data would be used under their preset restrictions
and they get paid for their data contribution.
In this paper, we take a formal data market perspective and pro-
pose the first enD-to-end data marketplace with model-based pricing
(Dealer) towards answering the question: How can the broker as-
sign value to data owners based on their contribution to the models
to incentivize more data contribution, and determine pricing for
a series of models for various model buyers to maximize the rev-
enue with arbitrage-free guarantee. For the former, we introduce
a Shapley value-based mechanism to quantify each data owner’s
value towards all the models trained out of the contributed data.
For the latter, we design a pricing mechanism based on models’
privacy parameters to maximize the revenue. More importantly, we
study how the data owners’ data usage restrictions affect market de-
sign, which is a striking difference of our approach with the existing
methods. Furthermore, we show a concrete realization DP-Dealer
which provably satisfies the desired formal properties. Extensive
experiments show that DP-Dealer is efficient and effective.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has witnessed great success across various types
of tasks and is being applied in an ever-growing number of indus-
tries and businesses. High usability machine learning models de-
pend on a large amount of high-quality training data, which makes
it obvious that data are valuable. Recent studies and practices ap-
proach the commoditization of data in various ways. A data mar-
ketplace sells data either in the direct or indirect (derived) forms.
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These data marketplaces can be generally categorized based on
their pricing mechanisms: 1) data-based pricing, 2) query-based
pricing, and 3) model-based pricing.
Data marketplaces with data-based pricing are selling datasets
and allow buyers to access the data entries directly, e.g., Dawex
[1], Twitter [3], Bloomberg [4], and Iota [5]. Under these market-
places, data owners have limited control over their data usage, e.g.,
privacy abuse, which makes it challenging for the market to incen-
tivize more data owners to contribute. Also, it can be overpriced for
buyers to purchase the whole dataset when they are only interested
in particular information extracted from the dataset. Therefore, the
marketplace operates in an inefficient way that cannot maximize
the revenue.
Data marketplaces with query-based pricing [25, 26], e.g., Google
Bigquery [2], partially alleviate these shortcomings by charging
buyers and compensating data owners on a per-query basis. The
marketplace makes decisions about the restrictions on data usage
(e.g., return queries with privacy protection [29]), compensation
allocation, and query pricing. However, most queries considered
by these marketplaces are too simplistic to support sophisticated
data analytics and decision making.
Data marketplaces with model-based pricing [6, 13, 24] have
been recently proposed. In [13], the authors focus on pricing a
series of model instances depending on their model quality to max-
imize revenue, while [24] considers how to allocate compensation
in a fair way among data owners when their data are utilized for a
particular machine learning model of k-nearest neighbors (k-NN).
Thus, they are limited to either end of the marketplace but not both.
Most recently, [6] approaches it in a relatively more complete per-
spective by studying two ends of the marketplace, where strategies
for the broker to set the model usage charge from the buyers, and
for the broker to distribute compensation to the data owners are pro-
posed. However, [6] oversimplifies the role of the two end entities
played in the overall marketplace: the data owners and the model
buyers. For example, the data owners still have no means to control
the way that their data is used, while the model buyers do not have
a choice over the quality of the model that best suits their needs and
budgets.
Gaps and Challenges. Though efforts have been made to ensure
the broker follows important market design principles in [6, 13,
24], how the marketplace should respond to the needs of both the
data owners and the model buyers is still understudied. It is there-
fore tempting to ask: how can we build a marketplace dedicated
to machine learning models, which can simultaneously satisfy the
needs of all three entities, i.e., data owners, broker, and model buy-
ers. We summarize the gaps and challenges from the perspective of
each entity as follows.
• Data owners. Under the existing data marketplace solutions [6,
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24], the data owners receive compensation for their data usage
allocated by the broker. Except for this, they have no means to
set restrictions about their data usage after supplying their data to
the broker. The challenge to be addressed is: How to model the
data owners’ restrictions and their associated effect on model
manufacturing, model pricing, and compensation allocation?
• Model buyers. As with the same practice of selling digital com-
modities in several versions, current work [6, 13] provides a se-
ries of models for sale with different levels of quality. However,
their oversimplified noise injection-based version control quanti-
fies the model quality via the magnitude of the noise, which does
not directly align with the model buyers’ valuation of the model
in terms of its utility. How do we incorporate the model buyers’
perspective in the model valuation and use it to optimize both
model pricing and model manufacturing?
• Broker. The data owners’ restrictions and the model buyers’ esti-
mation of the model value should be taken into consideration by
the broker when making market decisions, e.g., compensation
allocation and model pricing. How can the broker align the two
ends’ requirements with the already complicated market design
principals in an efficient and effective way? That is, how can
the broker remain competitive (e.g., train higher utility model
with the data owner restrictions), while maximizing its revenue
to maintain a sustainable data market?
Data Owners Broker Model Buyers
…
   …
usage restrictions
…
   …
…
model
target model, budget
payment
compensation
usage restrictions
compensation
model
target model, budget
payment
…
Figure 1: An end-to-end data marketplace with model-based pric-
ing framework.
Contributions. In this paper, we bridge the above gaps and address
the identified challenges by proposing Dealer: an enD-to-end data
marketplace with model-based pricing. Dealer provides both ab-
stract and general mathematical formalization for the end-to-end
marketplace dynamics (Section 4) and a specific and practical dif-
ferentially private marketplace with algorithm designs that ensures
differential privacy of the data owners, one type of instantiation of
the model restriction.
End-to-End Mathematical Formalization of the Marketplace. We
first propose an abstract mathematical formalization for Dealer with
an emphasis on the understudied parts of the marketplace as dis-
cussed above. An illustration is provided in Figure 1, which in-
cludes three main entities and their interactions. In this general
Dealer (Gen-Dealer), we define the abilities and constraints for the
three entities (i.e., data owners, broker, and model buyers). From
the data owners’ perspective, Gen-Dealer aims to 1) allow the data
owners to restrict their data usage by the broker; and 2) have the
option to receive extra compensation if they are willing to partially
relax their restrictions. From the model buyers’ perspective, Gen-
Dealer provides a utility measure suitable for the model buyers’
model valuation, based on which the potential model buyers pro-
vide their willingness to purchase and payment estimation. From
the broker’s perspective, Gen-Dealer depicts the full marketplace
dynamics through abstract behavior functions. In addition to the
new features novely brought into the market design consideration
by Gen-Dealer, commonly recognized market design principals are
also well-accommodated into our approach. Prominent ones in-
clude: 1) compensation allocation in a fair and rational way, e.g.,
based on the widely-accepted Shapley value notion; 2) arbitrage-
free in model pricing, which prevents the model buyers from taking
advantage of the marketplace by combining lower-tier models sold
for cheaper prices into a higher-tier model to escape the designated
price for that tier.
Marketplace Instantiation with Differential Privacy. We also
provide a concrete end-to-end differentially private data market-
place instance. We focus on empirical risk minimization, a widely
used and well-studied family of supervised machine learning mod-
els. For the data owners’ restrictions, we consider the privacy re-
striction, which is arguably the most concerned issue for personal
data contributors. Differential privacy (DP) [16, 17], the de facto
standard in privacy-preserving data analysis nowadays, is intro-
duced to exemplify the data owners’ restriction requirements and
we will refer the differentially private data marketplace with model-
based pricing instance by DP-Dealer. In DP-Dealer, the market-
place sells a series of differentially private models to respect data
owners’ privacy restrictions. The higher tier models correspond to
models trained on data subsets contributed by the data owners with
lower DP restrictions. On the contrary, the lower tier models are
trained with higher DP restriction data subsets. We will consider
two types of data owner DP restrictions: 1) hard restriction which
has a rigid cutting point beyond that the data owners’ data cannot
be used for training; and 2) negotiable restriction which has a nego-
tiable range within that the marketplace still has the option to use
the data but with extra compensation. At the model buyers’ end,
DP-Dealer addresses the challenge of mismatched model tier rank-
ing standard by converting the model “manufacturing” tier ranking
standard to the model utility standard adopted by the model buyers
in making purchasing decisions. DP-Dealer accommodates market
design principals like fair compensation allocation and arbitrage-
free model pricing. To support the end-to-end marketplace dy-
namics with all design considerations, DP-Dealer establishes con-
strained objective functions and develops efficient algorithms to op-
timize market decisions.
We briefly summarize our contributions as follows.
• A general end-to-end data marketplace with model-based pric-
ing framework Gen-Dealer which is the first systematic study
that includes all market participants (i.e., data owners, broker,
and model buyers). Gen-Dealer formalizes the abilities and re-
strictions of the three entities and models the interactions among
them.
• A differentially private data marketplace with model-based pric-
ing DP-Dealer which instantiates the general framework. In ad-
dition to incorporating market design principals, DP-Dealer pro-
poses two data owner restriction schemes and provides the util-
ity estimation for the model buyers to choose models best suit-
ing their needs. DP-Dealer formulates a series of optimization
problems and develops efficient algorithms to make the market
decisions.
• A series of experiments are conducted to justify the design of
DP-Dealer and verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the pro-
posed algorithms.
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Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the related work. Section 3 provides the background
information, including the concept of Shapley value and its compu-
tation, the machine learning model exemplified in this paper, and
differential privacy related definitions and properties. We provide
the first end-to-end data marketplace with model-based pricing for-
malization and discuss the desiderata in Section 4. A concrete in-
stance of differentially private data marketplace with efficient algo-
rithms is derived in Section 5. We report the experimental results
and findings in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws a conclusion
and discusses future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss related work on data pricing and com-
pensation allocation.
2.1 Data Pricing
Ghosh et al. [20] initiated the study of markets for private data
using differential privacy. They modeled the first framework in
which data buyers would like to buy sensitive information to es-
timate a population statistic. They defined a property named envy-
free for the first time. Envy-free ensures that no individual would
prefer to switching their payment and privacy cost with each other.
Guruswami et al. [21] studied the optimization problem of rev-
enue maximization with envy-free guarantee. They investigated
two cases of inputs: unit demand consumers and single minded
consumers, and showed the optimization problem is APX-hard for
both cases, which can be efficiently solved by a logarithmic approx-
imation algorithm. Li et al. [28, 29, 30] presented the first theoret-
ical framework for assigning value to noisy query answers as func-
tion of their accuracy, and for dividing the price among data owners
who deserve compensation for their loss of privacy. They defined
an enhanced edition of envy-free, which is named arbitrage-free.
Arbitrage-free ensures the data buyer cannot purchase the desired
information at a lower price by combing two low-price queries.
Lin et al. [31] proposed necessary conditions for avoiding arbi-
trage and provide new arbitrage-free pricing functions. They also
presented a couple of negative results related to the tension between
flexible pricing and arbitrage-free, and illustrated how this tension
often results in unreasonable prices. In addition to arbitrage-free,
Koutris et al. [27] proposed another desirable property for the pric-
ing function, discount-free, which requires that the prices offer no
additional discounts than the ones specified by the broker. In fact,
discount-free is the discrete version of arbitrage-free. Furthermore,
they presented a polynomial time algorithm for pricing generalized
chain queries.
Recently, Chawla et al. [12] investigated three types of succinct
pricing functions and studied the corresponding revenue maximiza-
tion problems. Due to the increasing pervasiveness of machine
learning based analytic, there is an emerging interest in studying
the cost of acquiring data for machine learning. Chen et al. [13]
proposed the first and the only existing model-based pricing frame-
work in which instead of pricing the data, directly prices machine
learning model instances. They formulated an optimization prob-
lem to find the arbitrage-free price that maximizes the revenue of
the broker, and proved such optimization problem is coNP-hard.
However, their work only focuses on the interactions between the
broker and the model buyers. Furthermore, they assume there is
only one survey price for each model, which is too simplified.
2.2 Compensation Allocation
An acquiescent method to evaluate data importance/value to a
model is leave-one-out (LOO) which compares the difference be-
tween the predictor’s performance when trained on the entire dataset
and the predictor’s performance when trained on the entire dataset
minus one point [11]. However, LOO does not satisfy all the ideal
properties that we expect for the data valuation. For example, given
a point p in a dataset, if there is an exact copy p′ in the dataset, re-
moving p from this datasets does not change the predictor at all
since p′ is still there. Therefore, LOO will assign zero value to p
regardless of how important p is.
Shapley value is a concept in cooperative game theory, which
was named in honor of Lloyd Shapley [33]. Shapley value is the
only value division scheme used for compensation allocation that
meets three desirable criteria, group rationality, fairness, and addi-
tivity [24]. Combining with its flexibility to support different util-
ity functions, Shapley value has been extensively employed in the
data pricing field [6, 8, 19, 24]. One major challenge of apply-
ing Shapley value is its prohibitively high computational complex-
ity. Evaluating the exact Shapley value involves the computation
of the marginal utility of each user to every coalition, which is ]P-
complete [18]. Such exponential computation is clearly impracti-
cal for evaluating a large number of training points. Even worse,
for machine learning tasks, evaluating the utility function is ex-
tremely expensive as machine learning tasks need to train models.
The worst case is that we need to train O(2n) models for computing
the exact Shapley value for each data owner.
A number of approximation methods have been developed to
overcome the computational hardness of finding the exact Shap-
ley value. The most representative method is Monte Carlo method
[10, 18], which is based on the random sampling of permutations.
However, the time cost is still prohibitively high due to the high
training cost of deep learning models. Therefore, Ghorbani et al.
[19] and Ancona et al. [8] illustrated how to compute the approx-
imate Shapley value by performing stochastic gradient descent on
one data point at a time.
3. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the background and preliminaries of
Dealer. We summarize the frequently used notations in Table 1. In
particular, we denote the data owners by O1, ...,Oi, ...,On, a series
of models prepared by the broker for sale byM1, ...,Mm, ...,MM ,
and the model buyers by B1, ...Bk, ...,BK .
3.1 Established Market Design Principals
There are a number of market design principals, which are also
considered in data marketplaces with data-based pricing, query-
based pricing, and model-based pricing. In the following, we re-
view the most widely adopted ones and introduce related tech-
niques.
3.1.1 Fairness in Compensation Allocation: Shapley
Value
Shapley value based compensation is a prevalently adopted ap-
proach mostly due to its theoretical properties, especially the fair-
ness. Shapley value measures the marginal improvement of model
utility contributed by zi of data ownerOi, averaged over all possible
coalitions of the data owners. The formal Shapley value definition
of data owner Oi is shown as follows.
SVi =
∑
S⊆{z1 ,...,zn}\zi
U(S ∪ {zi}) −U(S)(
n−1
|S|
) (1)
where U(·) is the utility of the model trained by a coalition of the
data owners, and the model utility is tested on the training dataset.
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Table 1: The summary of notations.
Notation Definition
Oi the ith data owner
Mm the mth model
Bk the kth model buyer
Ztrain = {z1, z2, ..., zn} training dataset
Xtrain = {x1, x2, ..., xn} features of training dataset
ytrain = {y1, y2, ..., yn} labels of training dataset
zi = {xi, yi} the ith training data
Ztest testing dataset
Xtest features of testing dataset
ytest labels of testing datasetU model utility
SV Shapley value
UV utility valuation
UF utility function
MR model risk factor
MB manufacturing budget
DR data owner restriction function
, δ parameters for the DP
bc base compensation
ec extra compensation
tm target model
〈p(1), p(2), ..., p(M)〉 optimal pricing
(m, spm[ j]) survey price point
(m, pm[ j]) complete price point
Monte Carlo Simulation Method. Since the exact Shapley value
computation is based on enumeration which is prohibitively expen-
sive, we adopt a commonly used Monte Carlo simulation method
[10, 18] to compute the approximate Shapley value. We first sam-
ple random permutations of the data points corresponding to dif-
ferent data owners, and then scan the permutation from the first
element to the last element and calculate the marginal contribution
of every new data point. Repeating the same procedure over mul-
tiple Monte Carlo permutations, the final estimation of the Shapley
value is simply the average of all the calculated marginal contri-
butions. This Monte Carlo sampling gives an unbiased estimate
of the Shapley value. In practical applications, we generate Monte
Carlo estimates until the average has empirically converged and the
experiments show that the estimates converge very quickly. There-
fore, Monte Carlo simulation method can control the degree of ap-
proximation, i.e., the more permutations, the better the accuracy .
The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, where |pi| is the
number of permutations. The larger the |pi|, the more accurate the
computed Shapley value.
Algorithm 1: Monte Carlo Shapley value computation.
input : Ztrain = (Xtrain, ytrain) and Ztest = (Xtest, ytest).
output: Shapley value SVi for each data zi in Ztrain.
1 initialize SVi = 0;
2 for k=1 to |pi| do
3 we have a training dataset ordered in pik,
Zktrain = {zpik1 , zpik2 , ..., zpikn };
4 for i=1 to n do
5 SV(zpiki ) = U({zpik1 , ..., zpiki }) −U({zpik1 , ..., zpiki−1 });
6 SVpiki = SVpiki + SV(zpiki );
3.1.2 Versioning
For a perfect world, the broker would sell a personalized model
to each model buyer at a different price to maximize the revenue.
However, such personalized pricing is rarely possible in practical
applications. On the one hand, it is expensive to train different
models for different model buyers. On the other hand, it is difficult
to set an array of prices for the same model. Even if we could, it
would be impossible to get model buyers to stay within their in-
tended pricing strata rather than to look for the lowest price. Fi-
nally, the broker runs the risk of annoying or even alienating model
buyers if they charge different prices for the same model.
There is a practical way to set different prices for the same train-
ing dataset without incurring high costs or offending model buyers.
We can do it by offering the training dataset in different versions de-
signed to attract different types of model buyers. With this strategy,
which is called versioning [32], model buyers segment themselves.
The model version they choose reveals the value they place on the
training dataset and the price they are willing to pay. Therefore, in
our model marketplace, the broker would train M different model
versions by injecting different noise to different subsets of training
data contributed by the data owners.
3.1.3 Arbitrage-free in Model Pricing
Arbitrage is possible when the “better” model can be obtained
more cheaply than the advertised price by combining two or more
worse models with lower price. Arbitrage complicates the inter-
actions between the broker and the model buyers, i.e., the model
buyers need to carefully choose the models to achieve the lowest
price, while the broker may not achieve the revenue intended by
her advertised prices. Therefore, an arbitrage-free pricing function
is highly desirable. We say a pricing function is arbitrage-free if it
satisfies the following two properties proved in [13, 30].
Property 1. (Monotonicity). Given a function f : (R+)k → R+,
we say f is monotone if and only if for any two vectors x, y ∈ (R+)k,
x ≤ y, we have f (x) ≤ f (y).
Property 2. (Subadditivity). Given a function f : (R+)k → R+,
we say f is subadditive if and only if for any two vectors x, y ∈
(R+)k, we have f (x + y) ≤ f (x) + f (y).
3.2 Machine Learning Models
In this paper, we focus on the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM),
which is a widely-applied tool in machine learning. Denote the
training dataset by Ztrain := {zi}, i = 1, 2, ..., n, where zi ∼ D and
zi = (xi, yi). The xi ∈ Rd is the d-dimensional feature vector and
yi is the response value which can be {−1,+1} for binary classifica-
tion task or [0, 1] for regression task. The ERM has the following
objective function:
arg min
w∈Ω
L(w; Ztrain) + λ‖w‖22 = arg minw∈Ω
n∑
i=1
1
n
l(w; zi) + λ‖w‖22, (2)
where L(w; Ztrain) =
∑n
i=1 l(w; zi) is the empirical loss averaged
from losses taken from all zi, λ‖w‖22 is the regularizer and Ω is the
constraint set. In this paper, we focus on models with convex, Lip-
schitz continuous, and smooth loss (with respect to w) functions.
The formal definitions are in the following.
Definition 1. (Convex Loss Function) A loss function l(w) :
Rd → R is called convex if for all w1,w2 ∈ Rd,
|l(w1) − l(w)2| ≥ 〈∇l(w2),w1 − w2〉. (3)
In addition, if l(w1) − l(w)2 ≥ 〈∇l(w2),w1 − w2〉 + µ2 ‖w1 − w2‖22, for
µ > 0, l(w) is µ-strongly convex.
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Definition 2. (Lipschitz continuous Loss Function) A loss func-
tion l(w) : Rd → R is called L-Lipschitz continuous if for all
w1,w2 ∈ Rd,
|l(w1) − l(w)2| ≤ L‖w1 − w2‖2. (4)
Definition 3. (Smooth Loss Function) A loss function l(w) :
Rd → R is called β-smooth if for all w1,w2 ∈ Rd,
l(w1) − l(w)2 ≤ 〈∇l(w2),w1 − w2〉 + β2 ‖w1 − w2‖
2
2 (5)
We focus on the loss functions satisfying the above assumptions
like least square loss, logistic loss, and smoothed hinge loss. In
machine learning, these losses are thoroughly studied with theo-
retical properties like generalization performance, and easy to use
with efficient optimization algorithm with guaranteed convergence.
Furthermore, their differentially private versions are also equipped
with efficiency, utility, and privacy guarantees. As a result, we fo-
cus on this particular type of machine learning models in our mar-
ket design for a thorough understanding of our proposed market.
However, we would like to mention that most of our algorithms
can be applied to other types of machine learning models like the
popular deep learning family.
3.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a formal mathematical tool for rigorously
providing privacy protection. However, none of the existing (pub-
lished) data marketplace with model-based pricing paper has con-
sidered it and it is still unknown how it can be incorporated in data
marketplace with model-based pricing and how it affects market
designs when adopted.
Definition 4. (Differential Privacy) A randomized algorithmA
is (, δ)-differentially private, if for any pair of datasets S and S′
that differs in one data sample, and for all possible output O ofA,
the following holds,
P[A(S) ∈ O] ≤ eP[A(S′) ∈ O] + δ, (6)
where the probability is taken over the randomness ofA.
In practice, for a meaningful DP guarantee, the parameters are cho-
sen as 0 <  ≤ 1, δ  1N , where N is the number of data samples.
Lemma 1. (Simple Composition) LetA j be an ( j, δ j)-differentially
private algorithm. We have A = (A1, ...,AJ) is (∑Jj=1  j,∑Jj=1 δ)-
differentially private.
Lemma 1 is essential for DP mechanism design and analysis, which
enables algorithm designers to compose elementary DP operations
into a more sophisticated one. More importantly, we will show
that it plays a crucial role in model market design as well. That is,
Lemma 1 determines that DP is an appropriate mechanism for ver-
sioning models, based on which prices have to satisfy the arbitrage-
free property.
Definition 5. (`2-sensitivity) A function f : DN → Rd has `2
sensitivity ∆2 if
max
neighboring S,S′
‖ f (S) − f (S′)‖2 = ∆2 (7)
For training ERM with DP restriction, a popular method is the ob-
jective perturbation, which perturbates the objective function of the
model with quantified noise. Conventional objective perturbation
only supports DP guarantee for the exact optimum, which is hardly
achievable in practice. In this paper, we follow the enhanced objec-
tive perturbation called approximate minima perturbation [9, 22],
which allows solving the perturbed objective up to α approxima-
tion. It uses a two-phase noise injection strategy that perturbates
both the objective and the approximate output. The detail is sum-
marized in Algorithm 2. The algorithm trains a (, δ)-DP model
based on training dataset Ztrain, which outputs model parameter
wDP. In particular, Line 2 perturbates the model with calibrated
noise N1, Line 3 optimizes the perturbated model which is followed
by an output perturbation with noise N2. Finally, wDP is obtained
by a projection to the constrained set Ω.
Algorithm 2: Objective perturbation for differentially private
ERM training.
input : Ztrain and (, δ).
output: wDP.
1 Sample N1 ∼ N(0d, σ21Id), where σ1 = 20L
2 log(1/δ)
2
;
2 Objective Perturbation:
LOP(w) = L(w; Ztrain) + λ‖w‖22 + 1n 〈N1,w〉;
3 Optimize LOP(w) to obtain α approximate solution wˆ;
4 Sample N2 ∼ N(0d, σ22Id), where σ2 = 40α log(1/δ)λ2 ;
5 return wDP = pro jW(wˆ + N2);
4. GENERALEND-TO-ENDDATAMARKET-
PLACEWITHMODEL-BASEDPRICING
In this section, we propose Gen-Dealer to model the entire end-
to-end data marketplace with model-based pricing. Gen-Dealer
models the following three aspects of the data marketplace: 1) the
functionalities and restrictions of the three participating entities; 2)
interactions between the participating entities; 3) market decisions
taken by the broker. In addition to the well recognized market de-
sign principals considered by previous work, we bring new consid-
erations for the two ends of the marketplace (i.e., the data owners
and the model buyers), and study how the marketplace interactions
should respond to their requirements and how the market decisions
will be affected to maintain a sustainable (or even profitable) data
marketplace with model-based pricing.
4.1 Formalization of Marketplace Entities
To begin with, we formalize the three participating entities as
follows.
Data Owners. Data owners can be professional institutes, orga-
nizations, or individuals. In this paper, we focus on the individual
case where each data ownerOi contributes their own data zi. For or-
ganizations or institutes which collects multiple individual owners’
data for sale, we treat every atomic data tuple within the dataset as
an individual data owner. Individual data owners are interested in
contributing their data for compensation, e.g., coupons, exclusive
sale, cashback, but are cautious about their data usage, e.g., per-
sonal privacy exposure. The three main functionalities of the data
owners are shown as follows.
1. Contributing Data: each data owner can contribute the personal
data to the broker. Denote the data of data owner Oi by zi =
(xi, yi), where xi is the feature vector and yi is the response vec-
tor.
2. Setting Usage Restriction: the data owners will set restrictions
on how their data can be used, e.g., what types of models or how
many models their data can be used. In this paper, we consider
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a natural strategy, where Oi sets one restriction per each model
to train. That is, for model Mm, Oi provides Data Restriction
function DRmi . Two types of restriction functions are modeled
in this paper. The first is the simpler “in or out” restriction,
where DRmi = {0, 1} is an indication function providing hard
restriction on whether zi is allowed to be used for training the
mth model (DRmi = 1) or not (DRmi = 0). The second provides
negotiable ranges that DRmi is not only a function of the model
tier but also related to extra compensation (ecmi ): DRmi (ecmi ) ={0, 1}. That is, zi can be used for training modelMm if the extra
compensation ecmi satisfies Oi’s expectation.
3. Receiving Compensation: After the sales, the data owners re-
ceive compensation based on their data usage. In addition, extra
compensation will be paid if their data is used after negotiation.
In particular, the extra compensation ecmi is a function of risk
factor riskm to be introduced in the next subsection: ecmi = 0, if
riskmi ≤ MRm and is an nondecreasing nonnegative function of
riskmi −MRm if riskmi >MRm.
Discussion 1. Compared to existing machine learning model
marketplace designs which limit the data owners actions to merely
contribute data and receive compensation, our formulation has the
following two strengths: 1) it allows the data owners to set data us-
age restrictions; 2) the negotiable-type restrictions help data owner
to better estimate the value of their personal data, which is often
difficult for individuals who have limited market information and
evaluation of data usage risk. We believe that by better model-
ing the data owner by providing the rights on setting data usage
restrictions and receiving extra compensation, it will eventually in-
centivize more data owners to contribute their data.
Assumption 1. The data owners do not fake data. Each data
owner only contributes one data sample and all data are indepen-
dent.
Remark 1. In practice, each data owner may have multiple atomic
data tuples, and those data tuples among different data owners may
be correlated. Therefore, we need to consider their relationship
when we allocate compensation. For the correlated data, we leave
it as an open question.
Model Buyers. Model buyers can be industries or everyday users,
who are interested in purchasing machine learning models to ei-
ther integrate into their product or support certain decision making.
They have very different budgets and model utility requirements. In
this paper, we focus on the single minded model buyers who will
purchase at most one model. There are two functionalities of the
model buyers as follows.
1. Providing Purchase Willingness: Bk provides the purchase will-
ingness by providing (tmk, vk), where the target model tmk ∈
{1, ...,M} indicates target model of Bk and vk is the purchas-
ing budget. We note that the number of potential model buyers
can be very large, but the purchase willingness of hundreds of
sampled model buyers is enough for the broker to make market
decision.
2. Model Transaction: Bk decides to purchase the target model or
not by comparing the released price p(tmk) by the broker and
her budget.
Broker. The broker collects data from the data owners and trains
a series of machine learning models for sale to the model buyers.
Let the Models be M1, ...,Mm, ...,MM . As discussed, a common
versioning strategy is to sell the models in various tiers, from the
lowest tier (sayM1) to the highest tier (sayMM). For these mod-
els, it sets prices 〈p(M1), ..., p(MM)〉. In addition, we assume the
broker is honest in the sense that it will strictly follow contract
with the data owners, e.g., respecting their usage restrictions, al-
locating the compensation based on the true data usage. The bro-
ker also wishes to remain competitive by training the best model
for each tier within that tier’s resource budget. More importantly,
the broker interacts with both the data owners and the model buy-
ers, and makes various market decisions, which are detailed in
the later sections. Finally, we assume there is a model risk fac-
tor MRm associated with each model Mm to be detailed in Sec-
tion 4.3. The model risk measures how large certain risk is to
the data owner who participates in the model training. When the
risk is low, the broker usually puts high restrictions on data us-
age, which often leads to limited data information extraction. As a
result, the lower risk model often corresponds to lower tier mod-
els coming with a lower price. We denote such connection by
〈p(MR1), ..., p(MRM)〉, where MR1 ≤ ... ≤ MRM and the price
satisfies arbitrage-free with respect to the model risk. In a more
generalized market setting, multiple brokers can co-exist, which
forms a competitive relationship. To focus on the principal func-
tionalities of a broker, we follow existing work [6, 13, 24] to con-
sider only a single broker case in this paper.
4.2 Formalization of Marketplace Dynamics
In this subsection, we formalize the data marketplace dynamics,
which consist of the interaction between the data owner and the
broker, the interaction between the model buyer and the broker.
Interaction between Data Owner and Broker.
• Data Collection: The broker posts model tiers M1, ...,MM and
explains each tier’s model riskMRm to the data owners and how
each tier will possibly be compensated if a data owner chooses
to participate. The data owner Oi contributes data zi and set data
usage restriction DRmi as well as a potential extra compensation
ecmi if he is willing to negotiate, for all m = 1, ...,M. Recall thatDRmi and ecmi are functions ofMRm.
• Compensation Allocation: After training the models under data
usage restrictions (see Model Training part in the next subsec-
tion), the broker pays compensation to the data owners accord-
ing to the Compensation Allocation market decision algorithm
detailed in the next subsection. Three key quantities are Utility
Valuation to modelMm: UVmi , its base compensation: bcmi , and
extra compensation: ecmi .
Interaction between Model Buyer and Broker.
• Market Survey: The broker posts the models tiers M1, ...,MM
to the potential model buyers. Each model buyer Bk provides
purchase willingness (tmk, vk).
• Model Transaction: The broker makes the model pricing 〈p1, ..., pM〉
(see Model Pricing in the next subsection) based on (tmk, vk).
The model buyers then make purchase decisions and complete
the transaction if meeting budget restriction.
Discussion 2. The data owners’ contributing willingness is based
on risk level if their data is used for training modelMm, while the
model buyers’ purchasing willingness is based on the usefulness
of the model (i.e., model utility). Thus, the two ends have a dif-
ferent standard for the same model tier, which requests the broker
to make optimal market decisions to bridge the two ends’ different
requirements.
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4.3 Marketplace Decision Making
4.3.1 Model Training under Data Usage Restriction
In this part, we propose a brand new versioning strategy, which
centers on the data owners’ perspective, rather than simply low-
ering the quality of the model which merely considers the model
buyers’ payment ability like [13].
Versioning. In general, more data owners’ contribution makes
the “manufacturing cost” of the corresponding model cheaper, be-
cause the broker has many alternative choices and tends to dom-
inate the compensation bargain. On the contrary, for the models
with higher risk, much fewer data owners are willing to participate,
which makes the broker have to pay higher compensation to in-
trigue more data contribution. With increased manufacturing cost,
the product (i.e., the model for sale) price should increase. Thus,
we propose to set a version based on the participating risk, which is
out of the data owners’ perspective. However, since the model buy-
ers, in general, do not care about the risk factor but the model utility,
the broker should provide conversion from the risk-tiering standard
to the model utility standard for each model tier. To bridge both
ends, the broker needs to make market decisions (e.g., set model
pricing) constrained by all participating entities’ requirements as
constraints. As a result, it assures our claim that designing the data
marketplace with model-based pricing from end to end is of neces-
sity and importance.
Recall that each modelMm is associated with model riskMRm.
The versioning is a process where the broker trains a series of mod-
els with different model risks:MR1, ...,MRM under the restrictions
of all n data owners DRmi and extra compensation requirements
ecmi . On the model buyer’s end, the broker in our marketplace will
provide a utility function UF (MRm) for each risk-based model
tier, since the utility is the fundamental model property interested
to the model buyers.
In comparison, the versioning strategy of the existing model mar-
ket [13] produces different versions of models by controlling model
utility through directly adding noise to the model parameters, in or-
der to suit different model buyers coming with various payment
ability. Obviously, their simplified versioning strategy fails to re-
flect the true “model manufacturing cost”.
Model UtilityMaximization withManufacturing Budget. Given
Oi = (zi,DRmi ) orOi = (zi,DRmi (ecmi )), for i = 1, 2, ..., n, the broker
trains each modelMm under data usage restrictions and tries its best
to train the best model for each model tier to remain competitive.
Let data owner Oi’s preferred model risk be riski, which indicates
the highest risk she wants to take (without extra compensation). In
this paper, we instantiate the data restriction DRmi function as fol-
lows: 1) for the hard restriction case, DRmi = I(MRm ≤ riski),
i.e., the data can be used forMm only when the model riskMRm
is lower than the data owner’s preferred risk riski; 2) for the nego-
tiable case, DRmi (ecmi ) = I(MRm ≤ riski) ∧ I(ecmi ), i.e., the data
can be used either the model risk is lower than the preferred risk,
or the extra compensation is made.
For the simpler hard data usage restriction, the broker trains
model Mm with data Subset: {Sm : i ∈ 1, 2, ..., n, s.t. DRmi = 1}.
For the negotiable data usage restriction, under limited manufac-
turing budget MB, the broker needs to decide whose data worth
the extra compensation, so that the utility valuation of the trained
model will be maximized for the broker to be competitive in the
market. Denote the utility valuation (to be detailed in the next sub-
section) of zi to model Mm by UVmi . We formalize the subset
selection of Sm as a training budget constrained utility valuation
maximization problem as follows.
arg max
Sm⊆{z1 ,...,zn}
∑
i∈Sm
UVmi , (8)
s.t. (
∑
i∈Sm
(bcmi + ec
m
i (max{0,MRm − riski}))) ≤ MBm. (9)
In the above, the utility value UVmi and the base compensation
bcmi should satisfy certain market design principals, which will be
discussed in the following.
4.3.2 Compensation Allocation
In this part, we elaborate how Gen-Dealer allocates base com-
pensation bcmi and utility valuation UVmi strategy. Recall that for
model Mm, its base compensation bcmi and extra compensation
ecmi . The extra compensation is a function of the data owner pre-
ferred risk riski and the model risk MRm: if MRm ≤ riski, data
owner Oi will participate the training ofMm with only base com-
pensation; else if MRm > riski, ecmi is charged with respect toMRm− riski, i.e., the broker needs to pay for the extra risk the data
owner suffers. Together, ecmi is a function of max{0,MRm − riski}
as shown in Equation (9).
For the base compensation, Gen-Dealer allocates it based on the
zi’s Utility ValueUVmi , whereUVmi is based on the (approximate)
Shapely value and divides bcmi according to the relative Shapely
value. This way, the true contribution of data owner Oi to model
Mm can be evaluated and the base compensation is consistent with
market design principals. To be practical, efficient approximation
algorithms will be utilized.
To summarize, Gen-Dealer will allocate the compensation to
data ownerOi for participating modelMm as bcmi +ecmi (max{0,MRm−
riski})). The total compensation allocated to data owner Oi is:
M∑
m=1
I(i ∈ Sm) ·
[
bcmi + ec
m
i (max{0,MRm − riski}))
]
, (10)
where I(i ∈ Sm) is an indicator function for indication whether zi is
in data subset Sm for trainingMm.
4.3.3 Market Survey and Revenue Maximization
In this part, we show how to construct the market survey between
the broker and the potential model buyers, and how the broker max-
imizes the revenue based on the market survey.
Market Survey. Prior to release models and prices for sale, the
broker will estimate the price for each model through a market sur-
vey, which can be done by the broker himself or by third-party
companies like consultation service providers. Let the survey size
by K′, i.e., K′ potential model buyers are recruited to provide their
purchasing willingness. The survey result will contain K′ tuples,
one from each survey participant. For the kth survey participant, it
provides (tmk, vk), where tmk ∈ {1, ...,M} is the target model and
vk is the acceptable price of model tmk she is willing to purchase.
We note that the survey participants may have an incentive to report
lower valuations in order to decrease the price, which can be alle-
viated by the digital goods auction [7] based on two approaches:
random-sampling mechanisms and consensus estimates.
Revenue Maximization (Model Pricing).
With the surveyed purchasing willingness, the broker will price
each model in the aim of maximizing revenue and at the same time
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following the market design principal of arbitrage-free. To do so,
the revenue maximization problem is formulated as follows.
arg max
〈p(MR1),...,p(MRM )〉
M∑
m=1
K′∑
k=1
p(MRm) · I(tmk == m) · I(p(MRm) ≤ vk),
(11)
s.t. p(MRm) + p(MRm′ ) ≥ p(MRm +MRm′ ), MRm,MRm′ ≥ 0,
(12)
p(MRm) ≥ p(MRm′ ), MRm ≥ MRm′ ≥ 0, (13)
p(MRm) ≥ 0, MRm ≥ 0, (14)
whereMRm is the model risk defined in Section 4.1, p(MRm) is the
model price for modelMm whose model risk isMRm. In the next
section, we will see that this problem is co-NP hard and we will
provide an efficient approximation with accuracy bound algorithm
there for our DP-Dealer instance.
5. ADIFFERENTIALLYPRIVATEDATAMAR-
KETPLACEINSTANCEANDEFFICIENT
APPROXIMATE OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we propose a concrete realization of Gen-Dealer,
a differentially private data marketplace with model-based pricing
framework DP-Dealer. We illustrate the functionalities and restric-
tions of the data owners and the model buyers in DP-Dealer in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Furthermore, in Section 5.3, we
present the broker’s functioning in DP-Dealer by providing con-
crete solutions, which are efficient approximate optimization al-
gorithm to make the market practical. Finally, we summarize the
complete DP-Dealer dynamics in Section 5.4.
5.1 Data Owner
We provide a data owner instance by instantiating its risk factor,
data restrictions, and extra compensation functions. For the risk
factor, we focus on the privacy-preserving issue, which is arguably
one of the major concerns limiting individual users from contribut-
ing their data. The data owners wish to contribute data for model
training with a certain level of privacy in exchange of a fair share of
compensation. We follow the differential privacy notion and instan-
tiate both the hard and negotiable data usage restriction cases. Let
the model risk factorMRm of modelMm be described by m which
corresponds to m-differential privacy of the model. Traditional DP
system and algorithm designs mostly consider the differential pri-
vacy strictness out of the broker’ and the model buyers’ perspec-
tive, which sets it as a tradeoff factor as long as it affects the model
utility within a certain level. This overlooks the true privacy de-
mand of the data owners. For those who do consider personalized
DP budget, they seldom consider what value the privacy parameter
actually means to the data owner. Under such a lack of reward sce-
nario, the data owner still has difficulty evaluating their own privacy
demands. Our design allows the data owners to choose their own
privacy preference and receives rewards for providing more useful
personal information. We believe it is a good starting point for a
practical data marketplace with model-based pricing that respects
the data owners’ privacy demand and incentivizes the data owners
for their personal data contribution.
Under the differential privacy risk factor, the three functionalities
of data owner Oi are shown as follows.
1. Contributing Data: data ownerOi contributes her data zi = (xi, yi)
to the broker;
2. Setting Usage Restriction: let the personal risk preference riski
be (i, δ)-DP1.
Hard DP requirement. In the first simplified case, each data
owner Oi chooses whether her data is allowed for training model
Mm with certain level of privacy restriction by DP parameter

pre f er
i . That is, data owner Oi only allows her data to be used
for models with DP restrictions stricter than i, i.e., m ≤ i.
Then, the data restrictionDRmi = I(m ≤ i).
Negotiable DP requirement. We further consider a more com-
plicated data owner strategy, where the data owners have more
options for making their own trade-offs between compensation
and privacy risk. For data owner Oi, in addition to DP require-
ment i, she is also willing to trade some of the privacy for more
compensation. To do so, we introduce an extra compensation
function ecmi (i, 
m), which pays an extra fraction of the base
compensation (allocated based on Shapley value) to compen-
sate for the higher privacy risk. In this case, the data usage
restriction function is also a function of the extra compensa-
tion: I(ecmi (i, 
m)) which indicates whether the extra compen-
sation has been allocated. Thus, DRmi (ecmi ) = [I(m ≤ i) ∧
I(ecmi (i, 
m))].
3. Receiving Compensation: For both cases, we let the base com-
pensation bcmi to be proportional to the relative approximated
Shapley value (see the broker instance in the following). In ad-
dition, for the negotiable case, we introduce the extra compen-
sation function if m > i but the broker is willing to use zi for
training Mm to maximize the model value (subject to the con-
straint of the manufacturing budget).
Extra Compensation Function. In particular, we present three
types of the extra compensation function ecmi (i, 
m): concave,
linear, and convex, to model three user inclinations of their per-
sonal privacy risks: reserved, balanced, and casual, correspond-
ingly.
• linear: ecmi (i, m) = ρmi bcmi max{0, m − i};
• convex: ecmi (i, m) = ρmi bcmi (max{0, m − i})2;
• concave: ecmi (i, m) = ρmi bcmi (max{0, m − i})
1
2 ;
For the ease of presentation, we use ecmi to replace ec
m
i (i, 
m) to
express the extra compensation of data owner Oi on modelMm in
the following.
Discussion 3. For all cases, each data owner Oi has the max-
imum total potential privacy leakage
∑M
m=1 
m
i . In this work, we
assume the data owners do not have too much information about
the data marketplace except the information given by the broker.
Thus, they invariably invest their total privacy budget to each of
the M models, which can be suboptimal for certain owners. In the
future, we will consider more informed data owners, who have not
only more knowledge about the data marketplace, e.g., the demand
for each type of model, but also the quality and privacy restrictions
of other data owners. With the additional market information, data
owners can allocate their total privacy leakage more intelligently
by investing their privacy budget towards models returning them
more compensation.
1In this paper, we assume the δ is sufficiently small so that we
do not consider its value and composition for the remaining of the
paper for convenience.
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Assumption 2. The goal of adding DP noise in models is to
limit what can be inferred from the models about individual train-
ing data tuples. Therefore, it is better for the broker to support
the relationship between DP parameter  and what can be inferred
from the models to the data owners. We note that such a relation-
ship can be implemented by [23].
5.2 Model Buyer
The model buyers in DP-Dealer have the same functionalities
with the model buyers in Gen-Dealer shown in Section 4.1 when
considering the differential privacy instantiation.
Assumption 3. The arbitrage-free property of the models is es-
tablished in terms of the differential privacy budget.
Remark 2. In practice, the model buyers can buy a couple of
weak models and convert those weak models to strong ones by em-
ploying some machine learning techniques such as ensemble learn-
ing, bagging and boosting. However, it may be infeasible to for-
mally characterize how model combinations behave in terms of the
model utility. Therefore, instead of ensuring the models to satisfy
arbitrage-free in terms of model utility, we ensure that the models
satisfy arbitrage-free in terms of DP parameter.
5.3 Broker
In this part, we present the broker’s functioning in the differ-
entially private data marketplace by providing concrete solutions
for selecting optimal training subsets with budget constraints, the
market survey to potential model buyers, and pricing models for
revenue maximization with an arbitrage-free guarantee.
5.3.1 Selecting Optimal Training Subsets with Bud-
get Constraint
Given the training data along with the data owners’ privacy and
extra compensation functions, the broker aims to train the highest
valued model for each price tier with the constraint on the privacy
and manufacturing/compensation budget. According to different
data owners’ requirements, the broker has two types of workflows.
Processing the Hard DP Restriction. In this case, for model tier
m, the broker is allowed to release modelMm trained strictly with
a subset Sm within the data owners Oi, where i ≤ m. We formalize
the optimization problem as follows.
arg max
Sm
∑
i∈Sm
SVmi , s.t.
∑
i∈Sm
bcmi ≤ MBm (15)
We omit the solutions for Equation (15) because it is a special case
of the following Equation (16).
Processing the Negotiable DP Restriction. A more practical case
is the negotiable DP restriction, where the broker has the option
to decide whether to intrigue high quality data owners to lower
their privacy restriction with extra compensation. We formalize
it as the following Budget Constrained Maximum Value Problem
(BCMVP) on modelMm:
arg max
Sm
∑
i∈Sm
SVmi , s.t.
∑
i∈Sm
(bcmi + ec
m
i ) ≤ MBm (16)
whereMBm is the manufacturing budget of modelMm. In essence,
we reallocate the payment of lower valued data owners to become
the extra compensation of higher valued data owners.
The above problem is difficult to be exactly solved. In fact,
we prove the problem is NP-hard. Given this NP-hard complex-
ity, we then present three approximation algorithms. First, we
present a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm using dynamic pro-
gramming technique. Then, we present a fully polynomial-time ap-
proximation scheme with the worst case bound if each data owner’s
compensation is not too large. Finally, we propose an enumera-
tion guess based polynomial time approximation algorithm with the
worst case bound by relaxing the compensation constraint, which
uses the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm as a subroutine.
NP-hardness proof. We prove that BCMVP is NP-hard by show-
ing that the well-known partition problem is polynomial time re-
ducible to BCMVP.
Definition 6. (Decision Version of BCMVP) Given a set S of n
data owners with their corresponding privacy compensation bcm1 +
ecm1 , bc
m
2 +ec
m
2 , ..., bc
m
n +ecmn and Shapley valueSVm1 ,SVm2 , ...,SVmn ,
the decision version of BCMVP has the task of deciding whether
there is a subset S1 ⊆ S such that ∑i∈S1 bcmi + ecmi ≤ B and∑
i∈S1 SVmi ≥ V.
Definition 7. (Decision Version of Partition Problem) Given a
set S of n positive integer values v1, v2, ..., vn, the decision version
of partition problem has the task of deciding whether the given set
S can be partitioned into two subsets S1 and S2 such that the sum
of the integers in S1 equals the sum of the integers in S2.
Theorem 1. The decision version of BCMVP is an NP-hard prob-
lem.
Proof. We show that there exists a polynomial reduction by prov-
ing that there exists a subset S1 ⊆ S such that ∑i∈S1 bcmi + ecmi ≤ B
and
∑
i∈S1 SVmi ≥ V if and only if there is a partition S1 and S2 such
that the sum of the integer values in S1 equals the sum of the inte-
ger values in S2. We construct the polynomial reduction as follows.
Consider the following instance of BCMVP: bcmi + ec
m
i = vi andSVmi = vi for i = 1, 2, ..., n, and B = V = 12
∑n
i=1 vi.
We show the reduction as follows.
(1) If there exists a partition S1 and S2 such that the sum of the
integer values in S1 equals to the sum of the integers in S2, there
exists S1 and S2 such that
∑
i∈S1 vi =
∑
i∈S2 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi. We choose
the set of data owners S1 in BCMVP and we have
∑
i∈S1 bc
m
i +ec
m
i =∑
i∈S1 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi = B and
∑
i∈S1 SVmi =
∑
i∈S1 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi = V .
Therefore, we know that there exists a subset S1 ⊆ S such that∑
i∈S1 bc
m
i + ec
m
i ≤ B and
∑
i∈S1 SVmi ≥ V .
(2) If there exists a subset S1 ⊆ S such that ∑i∈S1 bcmi + ecmi ≤
B and
∑
i∈S1 SVmi ≥ V , we partition the set S into S1 and S2 =
S − S1. We have ∑i∈S1 bcmi + ecmi = ∑i∈S1 vi ≤ B = 12 ∑ni=1 vi and∑
i∈S1 SVmi =
∑
i∈S1 vi ≥ V = 12
∑n
i=1 vi. This implies that
∑
i∈S1 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi. We also have
∑
i∈S2 vi =
∑n
i=1 vi − 12
∑n
i=1 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi.
Therefore, there exists a partition S1 and S2 such that
∑
i∈S1 vi =∑
i∈S2 vi =
1
2
∑n
i=1 vi.
Pseudo-polynomial time algorithm. We present a pseudo-polynomial
time algorithm for BCMVP. Pseudo-polynomial means that our
algorithm has the polynomial time complexity in terms of MBm
rather than the number of data owners n. We divide MBm into
dMBma e parts, where a is the greatest common divisor in bcmi + ecmi
for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. We define SV[i, j] as the maximum BCMVP
that can be attained with compensation budget ≤ j × a by only
using the first i data owners. The detailed algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 3. In Line 5, if the compensation budget is not enough,
we do not need to consider the ith data owner. Otherwise, we can
take Oi if we can get more value by replacing some data owners
from O1, ...,Oi−1 in Line 8.
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Algorithm 3: Pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for BCMVP.
input : bcmi + ec
m
i ,MBm, and SVmi for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
output: Sm.
1 for j=0:a:MBm do
2 SV[0, j] = 0;
3 for i =1 to n do
4 for j=0:a:MBm do
5 if bcmi + ec
m
i > j × a then
6 SV[i, j] = SV[i − 1, j];
7 else
8 SV[i, j] = max{SV[i − 1, j],SV[i − 1, j × a −
bcmi + ec
m
i ] + SVmi };
9 backtrack from SV[n, dMBma e] to SV[1, 0] to find the selectedOi;
Polynomial-time approximation algorithm. The time cost of the
proposed pseudo-polynomial time algorithm in Algorithm 3 is ex-
tremely dominated by the compensation budget. We propose a sim-
ple yet efficient polynomial-time approximation algorithm in Algo-
rithm 4, which is not sensitive to the compensation budget. We sort
the data owners in decreasing order of Shapley value per compen-
sation budget
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
in Line 3. In Lines 6-8, we proceed to take
the data owners, starting with as high as possible of
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
until
there is no budget. We also present a lower bound for Algorithm
4 in Theorem 2, where MAX is the maximum value that we can
obtain in function (16).
Algorithm 4: Polynomial-time approximation algorithm for
BCMVP.
input : bcmi + ec
m
i ,MBm, and SVmi for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
output: Sm.
1 for i=1 to n do
2 compute
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
;
3 sort
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
for i = 1, 2, ..., n in decreasing order and denote as
SVm1
bcm1 +ec
m
1
≥ SVm2bcm2 +ecm2 ≥ ... ≥
SVmn
bcmn +ecmn
;
4 B=0;
5 i=1;
6 while B ≤ MBm do
7 add bcmi + ec
m
i to B;
8 i=i+1;
9 return the corresponding Oi of those bcmi + ecmi in B;
Theorem 2. If for all i, bcmi + ec
m
i ≤ ζMBm, Algorithm 4 has a
lower bound guarantee (1 − ζ)MAX.
Proof. We set bcmk + ec
m
k as the first data that is not accepted
in Algorithm 4, i.e., we choose the corresponding data owners of
bcm1 + ec
m
1 , bc
m
2 + ec
m
2 , ..., bc
m
k−1 + ec
m
k−1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
≥ SVmkbcmk +ecmk .
⇒ SVmi ≥ (bcmi + ecmi )
SVmk
bcmk +ec
m
k⇒ SVm1 + SVm2 + ... + SVmk ≥ (bcm1 + ecm1 + bcm2 + ecm2 + ... +
bcmk + ec
m
k )
SVmk
bcmk +ec
m
k
Because we set bcmk + ec
m
k as the first data that is not accepted,
i.e., bcm1 + ec
m
1 + bc
m
2 + ec
m
2 + ... + bc
m
k + ec
m
k >
∑n
i=1 bcmi , we have
⇒ SVmk ≤ (SVm1 + SVm2 + ... + SVmk ) bc
m
k +ec
m
k∑n
i=1 bc
m
i⇒ SVmk ≤ ζ(SVm1 + SVm2 + ... + SVmk )
⇒ SVmk ≤ ζ(SV
m
1 +SVm2 +...+SVmk−1)
1−ζ
Because SVm1 + SVm2 + ... + SVmk ≥ MAX, we have SVm1 +
SVm2 + ... + SVmk−1 ≥ (1 − ζ)MAX. Therefore, Algorithm 4 has a
lower bound guarantee (1 − ζ)MAX.
Lemma 2. There are at most d 1
α
e data owners having compen-
sation bcmi +ec
m
i such that their corresponding Shapley value SVmi
is at least αMAX in any optimal solution.
Lemma 2 is easy to see, otherwise, the optimal solution value is
larger than MAX, which is a contradiction.
Enumeration guess based polynomial time approximation al-
gorithm. Although Algorithm 4 can achieve (1 − ζ)MAX, the re-
quirement of bcmi + ec
m
i ≤ ζMBm is too strict. We present another
algorithm with the same worst case bound but without the above re-
quirement. Let α ∈ (0, 1) be a fixed constant and h = d 1
α
e. We will
try to guess the h most profitable data owners in an optimal solu-
tion and compute the rest greedily as in Algorithm 4. The detailed
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5 as follows. We first enumerate
all the subsets with data owner size ≤ h in Lines 1-3. We delete
those subsets with higher compensation budget thanMBm in Lines
4-6. In Lines 7-10, for each remaining subset, we call Algorithm
4 to maximize the value with the remaining budget after taking the
≤ h data owners.
Algorithm 5: Guess and Polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithm for BCMVP.
input : bcmi + ec
m
i ,MBm, and SVmi for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
output: Sm.
1 for i=1 to h do
2 choose i data owner(s) to compose a subset S′;
3 we have
∑h
i=1
(
n
i
)
such subsets;
4 for j=1 to
∑h
i=1
(
n
i
)
do
5 compute the compensation budget of the data owners in S′;
6 delete those S′ if their compensation budget is larger than
MBm;
7 we have r remaining subsets S′1,S
′
2, ...,S
′
r;
8 for each subset S′j, j = 1, 2, ..., r do
9 let Oa be the data owner with the least Shapley value in S′j,
remove all data owners in S j − S′j if their Shapley value is
larger than SVma and get a new subset S′′j ;
10 run Algorithm 4 in S′′j with remaining compensation
budgetMBm −∑|S′j |i=1(bcmi + ecmi );
11 return the data owners in S′j and S
′′
j , where S
′
j and S
′′
j have the
highest Shapley value among j = 1, 2, ..., r;
Theorem 3. Algorithm 5 runs in O(nd
1
α e) time with (1 − α)MAX
worst case bound.
Proof. For the time complexity, we have at most
∑h
i=1
(
n
i
)
subsets
S′ after deleting those subsets if their compensation budget is larger
than MBm. That is, we have at most nh different subsets S′. For
each subset S′, the greedy Algorithm 4 only requires linear time to
handle the remaining data owners. Therefore, the total time cost
for Algorithm 5 is O(nd
1
α e+1).
For the worst case approximation bound, we assume subset S′ in
the optimal solution has exact h data owners. We note that subset S′
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in the optimal solution may have ≤ h data owners, but it is easy to
see that this does not affect the complexity analysis. If the number
of data owners in the optimal solution is less than h, the optimal
solution will be included in S′. In the following, we discuss the
case that the number of data owners in the optimal solution is larger
than h.
We have h + k data owners O1, ...,Oh,Oh+1, ...,Oh+k−1,Oh+k that
need to be considered, where O1, ...,Oh are the data owners in sub-
set S′, Oh+i is the ith data owner with the highest SV
m
i
bcmi +ec
m
i
in S′′. Oh+k
is the data owner with the highest
SVmi
bcmi +ec
m
i
rejected by the greedy al-
gorithm of Algorithm 4. Let MAX′ be the optimal value for the
data owners in S′′. Therefore, we have SV(S′′) + SVmh+k ≥ MAX′.
⇒ SV(S′′) ≥ MAX′ − SVmh+k
Based on Lemma 2, there are at most d 1
α
e data owners having
compensation bcmi + ec
m
i such that their corresponding Shapley
value SVmi is at least αMAX in any optimal solution, and those
d 1
α
e data owners are already pruned in Line 9. Therefore, we have
SVmh+k ≤ αMAX.
⇒ SV(S′′) ≥ MAX′ − αMAX
⇒ SV(S′) + SV(S′′) ≥ MAX′ + SV(S′) − αMAX
⇒ SV(S′) + SV(S′′) ≥ MAX − αMAX
That is, Algorithm 5 has the worst case bound (1 − α)MAX.
5.3.2 Market Survey to Potential Model Buyers
In the previous subsection, the broker requires the model budget
as a constraint to manufacture the models, which is before the mod-
els are available to the model buyers. To acquire the budget vari-
able, a common practice is to perform a market survey to collect
purchasing willingness from potential model buyers. That is, the
broker presents a series of potential models along with their perfor-
mance estimation to the potential model buyers, who then provide
which model they are willing to purchase and at what price. Based
on the survey result, the broker can estimate the budget by solving
a revenue maximization problem in the next subsection. The mar-
ket survey stage is sometimes the earliest stage among the overall
market dynamics.
In the following part, we propose a survey approach by overcom-
ing two difficulties. First, the broker encounters different standards
for categorizing the tier of each model. During the manufacture,
each data owner uses a differential privacy budget to differenti-
ate the model tier, the model buyers, however, are unlikely to care
about the restriction in the privacy of the model they purchase. On
the contrary, it is the model prediction performance that they pay
attention to. Thus, to sell models to the model buyers, the broker
needs to transit the m-DP based model description to the predic-
tion performance based model description. This raises the second
difficulty: the Shapley value based utility measure is not available
at the survey stage (the data may not even been collected yet). To
overcome both difficulties, we utilize a common estimation of util-
ity for the DP ERM models, which converts the DP parameter to
a general excess population loss by assuming all data samples are
identically independently distributed. It also reveals the relation
between the number of training samples and the utility estimation,
which provides a guide to the data collection.
For training each modelMm subject to DP restriction m, the bro-
ker uses a subset Sm out of all data available in the market D, whose
data owners have  ≥ m. Recall that the full dataset D is from dis-
tribution D, i.e., D ∼ D. For the model buyers, they care about
the performance of the model on their prediction tasks. That is, for
zpredict = (xpredict, ypredict), where zpredict ∼ D, the broker estimates
the value of a particular tier of model by estimating l(wm, zpredict).
To formalize it, we utilize the notion of population loss as follows,
Definition 8. (Population Loss)
L(w;D) := Ez∼D[l(w, z)], (17)
where the expectation is over the distribution of the data.
Thus, it measures the expected prediction loss of a modelMm when
given the output wm. With the population risk, the broker provides
the maximum discrepancy between the ideal model with model pa-
rameter w∗ and the DP one for sale wmDP. The following excess
population loss notion formalizes this discrepancy,
Definition 9. (Excess Population Loss [9])
∆L(AmAlgorithm2;Sm) := E[L(wmDP;D) − L(w∗;D)], (18)
wherew∗ = arg minL(w,D), s.t.w ∈ W (model parameter space),
AmAlgorithm2 denotes the DP algorithm in Algorithm 2 for training
model Mm with DP restricted dataset Sm, and the expectation is
taken over the randomness of Algorithm 2.
The specific accuracy measure can vary from application to ap-
plication and be chosen according to the model buyers. The order
of the population loss is more universal and general than a specific
choice of accuracy metric. Also, we believe the order makes more
sense than a particular number reported on a given testing dataset.
Thus, the excess population risk serves as a good estimation of util-
ity at the market survey stage.
The following theorem from [9] provides an estimate for the ex-
cess population loss for modelMm.
Theorem 4. Under certain conditions, the excess population loss
for the output wmDP of the objective perturbation based training al-
gorithmAmAlgorithm2 is
∆L(AmAlgorithm2; m,Sm) = O(max{
1√|Sm| ,
√
d log(1/δ)
m|Sm| }). (19)
From the above theorem, we can see that the model price dom-
inated by the excess population loss is an increasing function of 
because of two reasons: 1) from the model buyer perspective, the
larger the  (i.e., the looser the privacy restriction), the higher the
model utility, which will better meet the model buyers’ usage. It
is consistent with the common belief that a better product will cost
more. 2) from the data owner perspective, less owners are willing
to allow their data to be used for looser privacy protected mod-
els, which leads to less contributors without extra compensation
and the broker will have increased manufacturing cost in order to
recruit more data owners. It is also consistent with the common be-
lief that the product with higher manufacturing cost should be more
expensive.
In addition to the privacy budget, the training set size provides
an important role. First, in the previous model based pricing paper
[13], the authors claim that the versioning of the various quality of
models does not result into the extra cost for the broker, is however
not true according to the |Sm| in the above theorem. In fact, the
manufacturing cost actually increases for higher tier models (i.e.,
the one with a larger m). That is, less data owners are will to con-
tribute their data for models with larger m without extra compen-
sation. Thus, the broker has to spend more manufacturing cost on
recruiting more data owners for model training (i.e., for extra com-
pensation), otherwise the smaller Sm will lead to lower model utility
despite the increasing . Second, the |Sm| in the above theorem also
provides a good guidance to the broker on the data collection phase,
i.e. at least how much data owners the broker has to engage with.
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5.3.3 PricingModels for RevenueMaximization with
Arbitrage-free Guarantee
Before the market survey, the broker provides the excess popu-
lation risk estimation for each DP-model to the K′ survey partic-
ipants, who are potential model buyers and are interested in the
model performance rather than the privacy risk. Each participant
Bk is asked to provide which model they want to purchase (target)
tmk, and at what price vk. To make the arbitrage-free pricing p(m)
for model Mm with differential privacy m, the objective function
for the broker is
arg max
〈p(1),...,p(M )〉
M∑
m=1
K′∑
k=1
p(m) · I(tmk == m) · I(p(m) ≤ vk), (20)
s.t. p(m) + p(m
′
) ≥ p(m + m′ ), m, m′ ≥ 0, (21)
p(m) ≥ p(m′ ) ≥ 0, m ≥ m′ ≥ 0 (22)
We refer this problem as Revenue Maximization (RM) problem
and the optimal revenue for RM as OPT (RM). We use (m, spm[ j])
to denote the jth lowest survey price point in the mth model. For ex-
ample, in Figure 2, we have six survey participants shown in black
disk (1, sp1[1] = 1), (1, sp1[2] = 4), (2, sp2[1] = 3), (2, sp2[2] =
7), (3, sp3[1] = 5), and (3, sp3[2] = 8). In general, the smaller the
, the stricter the privacy restriction, which results to lower model
price. The reason for this price trend will be revealed by the next
subsection.
Given a set of survey price points (m, spm[1]) for m = 1, 2, ...,M,
does there exist a pricing function p(m) such that 1) is positive,
monotone, and subadditive; and 2) ensures p(m) = spm[1] for all
m = 1, 2, ...,M, which is a co-NP hard problem [13]. It is easy
to see that this co-NP hard problem is a special case of our RM
problem, i.e., there is only one survey price point for each model.
Therefore, it is suspected that there is no polynomial-time algo-
rithm for the proposed RM problem.
In order to overcome the hardness of the original optimization
RM problem, we seek to approximately solve the problem by re-
laxing the subadditivity constraint. We relax the constraint of p(m)+
p(m
′
) ≥ p(m + m′ ) in Equation (22) to
p(m)/m ≥ p(m′ )/m′ (23)
which still satisfies the requirement of arbitrage-free. We refer this
relaxed problem as Relaxed Revenue Maximization (RRM) prob-
lem. Generally speaking, we want to make sure that the unit price
for large purchases is smaller than or equals to the unit price for
small purchases, which is practical in the real marketplaces.
In the following, we show the maximum revenue for RRM,
OPT (RRM), has a lower bound with respect to the maximum rev-
enue for RM, OPT (RM).
Theorem 5. The maximum revenue for RM has the following
relationship with the maximum revenue for RRM
OPT (RRM) ≥ OPT (RM)/2
Proof. Given a feasible solution pRM of the revenue maximiza-
tion problem, we construct a solution pRRM such that for all m > 0,
pRRM(m) = m × min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x}, where pRRM(m) is the
price in RRM for modelMm with privacy parameter m. Let 0 <
m ≤ m′. We show that pRRM is a feasible solution of the relaxing
maximization problem as follows.
We prove that pRRM satisfies the monotone property as follows.
Let x′min = arg min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x}. We have two cases for x′min,
0 < x′min ≤ m and m < x′min ≤ m′. For the first case 0 < x′min ≤ m, we
have min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x} = min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x} because x′min
lies in the range of (0,m]. And then we have pRRM(m
′
) = m
′ ×
min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x} ≥ m × min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x} = pRRM(m).
For the second case m < x′min ≤ m′, we have pRRM(m) = m ×
min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x} ≤ m×{pRM( x)/ x}x=m = m×{pRM(m)/m} =
pRM(m) < pRM( x
′
min ) =  x
′
min {pRM( x′min )/ x′min }. Because x′min ≤
m′ and pRM( x
′
min )/ x
′
min = min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x}, then we have
 x
′
min {pRM( x′min )/ x′min } ≤ m′ ×min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x} = pRRM(m′ ).
That is pRRM(m) < pRRM(m
′
).
We prove that pRRM satisfies the subadditive property as follows.
We have pRRM(m)/m = min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x} ≥ min0<x≤m′ {pRM( x)/ x} =
pRRM(m
′
)/m
′
. Therefore, we have pRRM(m)/m ≥ pRRM(m′ )/m′
which is the subadditive property constraint.
Let xmin = arg min0<x≤m{pRM( x)/ x}, i.e., xmin ≤ m. We show
that for every m > 0, we have pRM(m)/2 ≤ pRRM(m) as fol-
lows. We have pRM(m) = pRM( xmin 
m
xmin
) ≤ pRM( xmind mxmin e) ≤
d m
xmin
epRM( xmin ) because pRM satisfies the subadditive property
constraint. Therefore, we have pRRM(m) = m{ pRM(
xmin )
xmin
} ≥ m
xmin
{ pRM(m)d m
xmin
e } ≥
m
xmin
{ pRM(m)m
xmin
+1
} ≥ pRM(m)/2 because xmin ≤ m. Because pRRM(m) =
m × min0<x≤m{ pRM(
x)
x
} ≤ m × { pRM(x)
x
}x=m = pRM(m), we have
pRRM(m) ≤ pRM(m). Therefore, for each m > 0, we have ∑K′k=1 ·I(tmk ==
m) · I(pRRM(m) ≤ vk) ≥ ∑K′k=1 ·I(tmk == m) · I(pRM(m) ≤ vk).
With pRM(m)/2 ≤ pRRM(m), we conclude that OPT (RM)/2 ≤
OPT (RRM).
Dynamic Programming Algorithm. In this part, we show an effi-
cient dynamic programming algorithm to solve the relaxed revenue
maximization problem.
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Figure 2: Revenue maximization example.
At first glance, for each model, it seems that all possible values
in the price range can be an optimal price, which makes the prob-
lem arguably intractable to solve. In the following, we show how
to construct the complete solution space in the discrete space and
prove the complete solution space is sufficient to obtain the maxi-
mum revenue.
Constructing Complete Solution Space. It is easy to see that
those survey price points should be contained in the complete so-
lution space. For each survey price point (m, spm[ j]), it determines
unit price spm[ j]/m and price spm[ j]. The general idea is that if
we choose (m, spm[ j]) as the price point in model Mm, it affects
the price for modelsMk, k = 1, ...,m − 1 due to the monotone con-
straint and the unit price for models Mk, k = m + 1, ...,M due to
the subadditive constraint. If we set the optimal price in model
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Mm as spm[ j], the unit price of the following models after model
Mm cannot be larger than spm[ j]/m. Therefore, for each survey
price point (m, spm[ j]), we draw one line l(m,spm[ j]) through sur-
vey price point (m, spm[ j]) and the original point. For each model
Mm, we draw one vertical line lMm . By intersecting line l(m,spm[ j])
and lMm , we obtain M − m new price points (lMk , l(m,spm[ j])) for
k = m + 1, ...,M. We note that we do not need to generate the
price points for k = 1, ...,m−1 because the unit price of modelMm
can only constrain the unite price of model Mk, k = m + 1, ...,M.
Furthermore, for each model, its price is also determined by the
survey price of its right neighbors. Therefore, we need to add the
survey price points of model Mm to models Mk, k = 1, ...,m − 1.
The detailed algorithm for constructing the complete solution space
is shown in Algorithm 6. In Lines 11-15, we use f (m, pm[ j]) to dis-
tinguish the survey price points from the other points in the com-
plete solution space. For ease of presentation in the following, we
name the price point in the complete solution space from Line 1
as SV (survey) point, the price point from Line 8 as SC (subad-
ditivity constraint) point, and the price point from Line 10 asMC
(monotonicity constraint) point.
Algorithm 6: Constructing complete solution space for the re-
laxed revenue maximization problem.
input : Model with noise parameter m and the jth lowest
survey price point for model with noise parameter m,
denoted as (m, spm[ j]).
output: Complete solution space.
1 add all the survey price points (m, spm[ j]) to the complete
solution space;
2 for each survey price point (m, spm[ j]) do
3 draw a line l(m,spm[ j]) through this point and the original
point;
4 for each model with noise parameter m do
5 draw a vertical line lMm ;
6 for each line lMm do
7 for each line l(m,spm[ j]) do
8 add point (lMk , l(m,spm[ j])) by intersecting line lMm and
line l(m,spm[ j]) to the complete solution space for
k = m + 1, ...,M;
9 for each survey price point (m, spm[ j]) do
10 add price point (k, spm[ j]) to the complete solution space
for k = 1, ...,m − 1;
11 for each price point (m, pm[ j]) in the complete solution space
do
12 if (m, pm[ j]) is a survey price point then
13 f (m, pm[ j]) = 1;
14 else
15 f (m, pm[ j]) = 0;
Example 1. We show an running example of Algorithm 6. In
Figure 2, we assume 1 = 1, 2 = 2, and 3 = 3. We add the
survey price points (1, sp1[1] = 1), (1, sp1[2] = 4), (2, sp2[1] = 3),
(2, sp2[2] = 7), (3, sp3[1] = 5), and (3, sp3[2] = 8) to the complete
solution space in Line 1. In Line 2, for the survey price point (1, 1),
we draw a line l(1,1) through this point and the original point in
Line 3. In Line 4, for model M1 with noise parameter 1 = 1,
we draw a vertical line lM1 . In Lines 6-8, for l1,1 and lM2 , we add
intersection (lM2 , l1,sp1[1]) = (2, 2) to the complete solution space.
In total, we have six such new price points shown in box. In Line 9,
for survey price point (3, sp3[1]) = (3, 5), we add price points (2, 5)
and (1, 5) to the complete solution space in Line 10. Similarly, we
also have six such new price points shown in circle. Therefore, for
the complete solution space, we have six price points for models
M1 andM3. We have five price points for modelM2 because the
intersection point of lM2 , l1,sp1[2] = (2, 8) is same to theMC point
(k, sp3[2]) = (2, 8) for k = 2. In Lines 12-15, we have f (2, 3) = 1
and f (2, 5) = 0.
Theorem 6. The complete solution space constructed by Algo-
rithm 6 is sufficient for finding the optimal solution of the relaxed
revenue maximization problem.
Proof. As we discussed in constructing complete solution space,
for each survey price point (m, spm[ j]), it can affect the model rev-
enue of modelMm, the unit price for modelsMk, k = m + 1, ...,M
and the price for models Mk, k = 1, ...,m − 1. We prove that the
SC andMC points are non-recursive, i.e., we do not need to gen-
erate new price points in the complete solution space based on the
generated SC andMC points.
Given a survey price point (m, spm[ j]) in model Mm, it deter-
mines aSC point in modelMm′ , where m′ > m, i.e., (m′, spm[ j]/m×
m
′
). We do not need to generateSC points based on (m′, spm[ j]/m×
m
′
) because it has the same SC points for models Mk, k = m′ +
1, ...,M with (m, spm[ j]). We may use (m′, spm[ j]/m × m′ ) to gen-
erate a MC point (k, spm[ j]/m × m′ ). If k > m, the new point
(k, spm[ j]/m × m′ ) is not necessary because spm[ j]/m × m′/k >
spm[ j]/m which violates the subadditive constraint. If k < m,
the new point (k, spm[ j]/m × m′ ) is also not necessary because
spm[ j]/m× m′ > spm[ j] which violates the subadditive constraint.
Given a survey price point (m, spm[ j]) in model Mm, it deter-
mines aMC point in modelMm′ , where m′ < m, i.e., (m′, spm[ j]).
We do not need to generate MC points based on (m′, spm[ j]) be-
cause those MC points are already determined by (m, spm[ j]). It
is also not necessary to generate SC points based on (m′, spm[ j])
because if (m′, spm[ j]) and (m, spm[ j]) are chosen as the optimal
prices, all the optimal prices for modelsMk, k = m′, ...m, ...,M are
determined, i.e., p(m
′
) = ... = p(m) = ...p(M).
A recursive solution. We define the revenue of an optimal solu-
tion recursively in terms of the optimal solutions to subproblems.
We pick as our subproblems the problems of determining the max-
imum revenue OPT (m, j), where OPT (m, j) denotes the maximum
revenue for considering the first m models and taking the jth low-
est price point in the complete solution space of model Mm. For
the full problem, the maximum revenue would be max{OPT (M, j)}
for all the price points (M, pM[ j]) in the complete solution space
in modelMM . For the price points in the complete solution space
of modelM1, we can directly compute OPT (1, j) for all the price
points because there is no initial constraint. For the price points in
the complete solution space of other models, we need to consider
both the monotone constraint and the subadditive constraint. We
have a recursive equation as follows.
OPT (m, j) = max{OPT (m − 1, j′)} + MR(m, j) (24)
where pm−1[ j′] ≤ pm[ j]&&pm−1[ j′]/m−1 ≥ pm[ j]/m and MR(m, j)
denotes the revenue from model Mm if we price model Mm for
pm[ j].
Computing the maximum revenue. Now, we could easily write a
recursive algorithm in Algorithm 7 based on recurrence (24), where
|pm| is the number of the price points in modelMm.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 7 can be finished in O(N2 M2) time.
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Algorithm 7: Dynamic programming algorithm for finding an
optimal solution of the relaxed revenue maximization problem.
input : Model with noise parameter m and its corresponding
price points in the complete solution space.
output: OPT (RRM).
1 for each modelMm do
2 sort the price points in the complete solution space in
decreasing order;
3 use (m, pm[ j]) to denote the jth lowest price point;
4 MR(m, |pm|) = pm[|pm|] f (m, pm[|pm|]);
5 for j = |pm| − 1 to 1 do
6 MR(m, j) = pm[ j]
∑|pm |
k= j f (m, p
m[k]);
7 for j = 1 to |p1| do
8 OPT (1, j) = MR(1, p1[ j]);
9 for each modelMm,m = 2, ...,M do
10 for each price point (m, pm[ j]) do
11 OPT (m, j) = max{OPT (m − 1, j′)} + MR(m, j), where
pm−1[ j′] ≤ pm[ j]&&pm−1[ j′]/m−1 ≥ pm[ j]/m;
12 p(L.OPT (m, j)) = pm−1[ j′] that satisfies OPT (m, j) in
Line 11;
13 OPT (RRM) = max{OPT (M, j)}, where j = 1 to |pm|.
Proof. For the O(N) survey price points, we general O(NM)
price points in the complete solution space. For each price point
in the complete solution space, we need O(NM) time to update
OPT (m, j). Therefore, Algorithm 7 requires O(N2 M2) time.
Example 2. In model M1 of Figure 2, we have OPT (1, j) for
j = 1, 2, ..., 6 shown in Table 2. For computing OPT (2, 2), there is
only one price point (1, 3) satisfying both the monotone constraint
and the subadditive constraint within model M1. Therefore, we
have OPT (2, 2) = OPT (1, 2) + MR(2, 2) = 3 + 6 = 9. Similarly, we
can fill the entire table shown in Table 2.
Constructing an optimal solution. Although Algorithm 7 deter-
mines the maximum revenue of RRM, it does not directly show
the optimal price for each model p(m). However, for each price
point (m, pm[ j]) in the complete solution space, we record the price
point p(L.OPT (m, j)) in modelMm−1 which has the maximum rev-
enue in those price points that satisfy both the monotone constraint
and the subadditive constraint with (m, pm[ j]) in Line 12 of Algo-
rithm 7. Therefore, we can recursively backtrack the optimal price
point in model Mm−1 from the optimal price point in model Mm.
We need O(nM) time to find the maximum value in OPT (M, j) and
O(M) time to backtrack. Therefore, we can construct an optimal
solution in O(NM) time. We note that such a solution may be one
of several solutions that can achieve the optimal value.
We show an running example in Table 2. We first obtain OPT (3, 3)
which has the maximum value among OPT (3, j) for j = 1, 2, ..., 6.
Therefore, we set p(3) = 5. We backtrack to OPT (2, 2) in model
M2 and set p(2) = 3. And then we backtrack to OPT (1, 2) in
model M1 and set p(1) = 3. Finally, an optimal pricing setting
is 〈p(1), p(2), p(3)〉 = 〈3, 3, 5〉. We note that in our running ex-
ample, the pricing setting 〈4, 5, 5〉 also has the maximum revenue
19.
Assumption 4. The broker is honest but curious.
Remark 3. In practice, the broker may be semi-honest or even
malicious. For these cases, we can take advantage of the local
Table 2: Example for constructing an optimal solution.
Model
# of points
1 2 3 4 5 6
M1 2 3 4 0 0 0
M2 6 9 9 11 4 Null
M3 15 18 19 19 11 4
differential privacy [15] in which the data owners and the model
buyers can add DP noise by themselves before sending their data
to the broker. Also, encryption-based techniques can be further
incorporated into the market design.
5.4 CompleteDifferentiallyPrivateDataMar-
ketplace Dynamics
We summarize the differentially private data marketplace with
model-based pricing dynamics from the broker’s perspective, which
is an end-to-end data marketplace with practical considerations and
consists of computationally efficient component algorithms. The
detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 8, which integrates all
the proposed algorithms in the previous sections. We assume that
the broker can set appropriate parameters M, m, andMBm based
on her market experiences, which is reasonable. For example, Mi-
crosoft can easily determine the different features assigned to Win-
dows 10 Home version and Windows 10 Pro version. Finally, al-
though instantiated with the DP market, we stress that Algorithm 8
can be applied to the general setting by switching the DP parameter
to the risk factor.
Algorithm 8: The complete broker functioning in DP-Dealer
Pipeline.
1 collect data and usage restriction among n data owners: collect
dataset D = {zi} along with DP restriction parameters i and
extra compensation function eci for i = 1, 2, ..., n;
2 decide a set of M models to train with model privacy parameter
m and manufacturing budgetMBm for m = 1, 2, ...,M;
3 %% Model training and releasing;
4 for m=1 to M do
5 data valuation: call Algorithm 1 to compute approximate
Shapley value SVmi for i = 1, 2, ..., n;
6 base compensation: compute bcmi =
SVmi∑n
i=1 SVmi
MBm;
7 data selection: call Algorithm 3, 4, or 5 to select training
subset Sm with manufacturing budgetMBm to maximize
SV(Sm);
8 model training: train the model with subset Sm by
Algorithm 2;
9 model releasing: release modelMm, its pricing p(m) and
estimated excess population loss ∆L(AmAlgorithm2; m,Sm);
10 perform market survey among K′ sampling model buyers
(survey participants): collect market survey results of model
demand tmk and valuation vk for k = 1, 2, ...,K′;
11 %% Model pricing;
12 model pricing: call Algorithms 6 and 7 to compute the optimal
price p(m) of modelMm for m = 1, 2, ...,M;
13 %% Compensation allocation;
14 for m=1 to M do
15 compute bci and eci of data owner Oi for i ∈ Sm by
proportionally dividing p(
m)∑M
m=1 p(
m)
OPT (RRM) and allocate
the corresponding compensation to Oi;
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6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present experimental studies validating: 1)our
proposed mechanisms for compensation allocation are efficient and
effective; 2) our proposed mechanisms for pricing models can gen-
erate more revenue for the data owners and the broker; 3) our
exquisitely designed dynamic programming algorithms for pricing
models significantly outperform the baseline algorithms.
6.1 Experiment Setup
We ran experiments on a machine with an Intel Core i7-8700K
and two NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti running Ubuntu with 64GB
memory. We employed SVM classifier as our model and used both
synthetic datasets and a real Breast Cancer dataset [14] in our ex-
periments. We implemented the following algorithms in Matlab
2018a.
• Greedy: The greedy algorithm for compensation allocation
in Algorithm 4.
• PPDP: The pseudo-polynomial dynamic programming algo-
rithm for compensation allocation in Algorithm 3.
• GuessGreedy: The guess and greedy algorithm for compen-
sation allocation in Algorithm 5.
• Dealer: The optimal prices computed by the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm in Algorithm 7 with survey price space.
• Dealer+: The optimal prices computed by the dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm in Algorithm 7 with complete solution
space.
• Linear: We take the lowest survey price from model M1
and the highest survey price from modelMM and use linear
interpolation for the remaining models M2, ...,MM−1 based
on the two end-prices.
• Low: We set the lowest price from all survey prices to all
models.
• Median: We set the median price from all survey prices to
all models.
• High: We set the highest price from all survey prices to all
models.
6.2 Compensation Allocation
Figures 3(a)(b) shows the compensation allocation time cost and
accuracy of Greedy, PPDP, and GuessGreedy of a various num-
ber of data owners, respectively. Because PPDP is significantly
affected by the budget and cannot work for a very large budget, we
set all budget to 10000 in our experiments for fair comparison. Fig-
ure 3(a) shows the time cost for a various number of data owners.
Greedy significantly outperforms both PPDP and GuessGreedy due
to its simplicity. GuessGreedy costs the highest time cost because
we need to enumerate
(
n
v
)
subsets, where n is the total number of
data owners and v is the size of the sampled subsets during enu-
meration. In our experiments, the time cost for GuessGreedy is
prohibitively high even we set v = 2. We skip some results of
Greedy and PPDP in the figures due to their prohibitively high time
cost. Figure 3(b) shows the accuracy of various algorithms on five
models. We employ three different algorithms Greedy, PPDP, and
GuessGreedy to choose three subsets for each manufacturing bud-
getMBm = 1.2 ∑ni=1 SVi, 1.4 ∑ni=1 SVi, 1.6 ∑ni=1 SVi, 1.8 ∑ni=1 SVi,
and 2.0
∑n
i=1 SVi, respectively. We also use ALL as a baseline,
which includes all the patients. We add differential privacy with
parameters  = 0.01, 0.1, 1, 5, and 10 in the training processing
(Algorithm 2) on the four datasets, respectively. We can see that al-
though the number of patients in subsets selected by Greedy, PPDP,
and GuessGreedy are less than the number of patients in ALL, the
accuracy is higher for larger , which verifies the effectiveness of
Shapely value. For example, for  = 10, there are only 337 patients
in the subset selected by Greedy, but the accuracy on that subset is
higher than the entire dataset ALL. For smaller , the accuracy on
ALL is higher. The reason is that for smaller , with the less bud-
get, we obtain a smaller subset. For example, for  = 0.01, there
are only 259 patients in the subset selected by Greedy. Comparing
different algorithms, the accuracy of the subset selected by PPDP is
only a little higher than Greedy. Therefore, we can employ Greedy
for most cases.
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Figure 3: Compensation allocation.
6.3 Revenue Maximization of Pricing Models
We experimentally study the revenue gain of our proposed algo-
rithms on different distributed datasets. We generate two datasets
with 100 survey price points (i.e., collecting from 100 potential
model buyers). The number of survey price points on each model
follows independent random distribution and Gaussian (mean=5,
standard deviation=3) random distribution, respectively. For the
first model of both datasets, we generate those survey price points
following independent distribution with range [1000, 5000]. The
remaining nine models follow a 100 increase on both the lower and
upper bound of the range.
Figures 4(a)(b)(c)(d) show the dataset, price, affordability ratio
(fraction of the model buyers that can afford to buy a model), and
revenue on an independent random distributed dataset, respectively.
Figure 4(b) shows that Dealer+, Dealer, and Linear have a simi-
lar price setting distribution. All models in Dealer have different
prices. For the price setting distribution of Dealer+, the first model
and the second model have the same price, the same to the fifth
model and the sixth model, the eighth model and the ninth model,
which maximizes the revenue comparing to Dealer and verifies the
effectiveness of our complete solution space construction. Figure
4(c) shows that Dealer+ has the highest affordability ratio except
for Low. For the most critical metric revenue, Dealer+ outperforms
the other algorithms at least 10%, which verifies the gain of our
complete solution space construction.
In practical applications, it is more likely that the survey price
point datasets follow Gaussian distribution rather than independent
random distribution. Figures 5(a)(b)(c)(d) show that all algorithms
have similar performances on Gaussian distributed dataset as on
independent distributed dataset.
6.4 Time Cost of Pricing Models
We experimentally study the efficiency of our proposed algo-
rithms for pricing models. Because Linear, Low, Median, and High
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Figure 5: Gaussian distribution.
algorithms only need to scan through the survey price points once,
the time cost is low. For the ease of presentation, we omit the exper-
imental results for those four algorithms. Instead, we compare our
proposed Dealer and Dealer+ with the classic exhaustion based ap-
proach. We first apply exhaustion-based approach to our complete
solution space named Base. However, the time cost of most of the
experiments is prohibitively high. Therefore, we apply exhaustion-
based approach to the survey price space named BaseAppr.
20 100 500 2500 12500
number of survey points
100
105
tim
e(s
)
Dealer+
Dealer
Base
BaseAppr
Figure 6: Time cost.
Figure 6 shows the time cost of Dealer, Dealer+, Base, and BaseAppr
on a various number of survey price points. Both Dealer+ and
Dealer linearly increase with the increase of the number of survey
price points, which verifies the efficiency of our proposed dynamic
programming algorithm. In practical applications, 12500 survey
points are enough for most of the surveys, the optimal Dealer+
only requires dozens of seconds on a PC. If the time cost is very
sensitive, we can employ Dealer which searches from the original
survey price space with a slight tradeoff in optimal revenue. The
time cost of both Base and BaseAppr is prohibitively high due to
the high volume price combinations for different models.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed the first end-to-end data marketplace
with model-based pricing framework towards answering the ques-
tion: how can the broker assign value to the data owners based
on their contribution to the models to incentivize more data con-
tributions, and determine optimal prices for a series of models for
various model buyers to maximize the revenue with arbitrage-free
guarantee. For the former, we introduced a Shapley value-based
mechanism to quantify each data owner’s value towards all the
models trained out of the contributed data and the data owners have
the abilities to control their data usage. For the latter, we designed
a pricing mechanism based on the models’ privacy parameter to
maximize the revenue. We proposed Gen-Dealer to model the end-
to-end data marketplace with model-based pricing and illustrate a
concrete realization of differentially private data marketplace with
model-based pricing DP-Dealer which provably satisfies the de-
sired formal properties. Extensive experiments verified that DP-
Dealer is efficient.
There are several exciting directions for future work. First, mul-
tiple brokers can co-exist in practical applications, which form a
competitive relationship to maximize the revenue for themselves.
Second, multiple risk factors forming a risk vector can be consid-
ered, which enables the market to take care of different types of
demands of the data owners. Third, personalized model manufac-
turing can be considered, which tailors the model training to each
model buyer to best suit their budget and model usage scenario.
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